Introduction
It is interesting that common sense is also worth considering, and why wouldn't it be? Obscurantism and philosophical "you're not part of our club"-ism, I guess, which is just kind of for narcs
It seems like right action ought to arise from right-orderedness of the soul (i.e. a healthy psyche)
Seperation of a human function, a human form in addition to its matter: It doesn't seem strange to me that the "human function" or "human form" could simply be a multifaceted, complex thing, like being sapient.
"It is worth remembering that in Greek a horse that ran fast could be said to have a `virtue' or excellence, in so far as it performed well its characteristic activity."
Heidegger and his language argument again
"What Aristotle means is that what is morally required is what the virtuous person would do in our circumstances."
The Golden Mean is ultimately a normative doctrine
[cite:@anscombeModernMoralPhilosophy1958]
Magnanimity is a profoundly un-Christian virtue if one is concerned purely with honour, but surely, if one "stands their ground" in the sense that they develop a personal relationship with God, it can become a Christian virtue?
"The law ultimately aims at the instantiation of virtue in the citizens it governs"
This seems more and more desirable by the second
Does justice "fit into the mold of the doctrine of the mean"?
"An unwillingness to exert one's rights is not any kind of injustice"
Maybe an injustice toward oneself?
Seemingly this is a problem of supererogation. Is excessive supererogation an injustice toward oneself?
"Ethics is not capturable in a set of explicit principles"
Maybe it is like logic, then, which shares notions of logical consequence such that there is something "done" when you do logic
Knowledge of the incontinent
It seems like empirical psych, in addition to even psychoanalysis, is much more accomplished in solving this problem
Pleasure is "unimpeded activity of one's natural state", but also not an end-in-itself
"The pleasures of philosophy are the pleasures of God"
[cite:@mengerNewLogic1937]
[cite:@stockerSchizophreniaModernEthical1976]
Book 1 -** on happiness
"The products are by their nature better than the activities"
A lot of actions, even entire sciences, are pursued for the sake of something else
I guess entire lifetime endeavors ("I am an electronic engineer") can be done in service of some unknown, greater end
Maybe the virtue of magnanimity can be reframed as being "confident in the target" in a sense? We have no idea whether we have hit the right target for the good. It is basically mysterious.
Mature people are more suited to speak on matters of the good; I would agree, insofar as the answer is not given from without
Hesiod's hierarchy is interesting (Understanders > knowers > neither), but again, it seems that a standing of one's ground throws a wrench into this.
"Nobody would call a person living this kind of life happy, unless he were closely defending a thesis"
This is interesting
All of the "lives" Aristotle discusses seemingly are not hitting the targeted end.
Shocker, Aristotle is an ontotheologian –** it seems that saying the prior things are substance, quality implies God is a substance with qualities just like any other
Happiness is believed to be complete without qualification
I think you can reverse this and say "that state of being which is good without qualification" and end up with a better ethics than trying to find a candidate.
1097b, Self-sufficiency for Aristotle means "a unit that carries its weight" almost
Approaching the good like a geometer and not a carpenter is important, but it also seems like Aristotle's work is not actually doing that. Rather, it is discovering necessary corollaries and things relational to the good if it were to exist, and whatever it may be.
All data harmonises with the truth, but soon clashes with falsity.
Why are goods of the soul the goodest?
But it seems the use of the good of the soul is where its goodness lies.
Seems an early form of pragmatism to me.
The happy person is someone who "engages in activities in accordance with complete virtue," but it seems like this happiness will disappear with bad fortune when there is not external cooperation.
Again, this might be where magnanimity is valuable. Knowing your happiness, and knowing you are happy; since nobody else can judge whether someone is happy.
Again, there seems to be this tacit acknoledgement of the permanence of the good, and a locating-it-without-grasping-it, in the notion that (1100b) activity in accordance with virtue "outlasts even the sciences."
I guess you could be an emotivist or a social constructivist about it.
Aristotle's focus on honour is interesting because of how out-of-place it seems now, esp. the discourse on the dead. There is some interesting anthropology to be done there.
The eros, logos, and thymos trichotomy resurfaces, not as formal aspects but as things present in the soul.
And logos, viz. the element with reason, is isolated as the unique factor.
"Virtue is distinguished along the same lines. Some virtues we say are intellectual, such as wisdom, judgement and practical wisdom, while others are virtues of character, such as generosity and temperance. For when we are talking about a person's character, we do not say that he is wise or has judgement, but that he is even-tempered or temperate. Yet we do praise the wise person for his state, and the states worthy of praise we call virtues."
Book 2 -** on the states of the soul
Woah, woah, woah, why are we sorting virtue into that of the intellect and that of character? You're not Plato, justify your claims!
Oh, nevermind, he does it in the last book
A lot of the discussion of abstention from pleasures and so on seems essentially psychological, even physiological, but this is also not really problematic at all. Applying logic to practicalities, even when the answer isn't "cool" or "esoteric" or fun, leads to useful and good results.
The claim that education is instruction/conditioning on how to "find pleasure or pain in the right things" seems dubious; aren't pleasures somewhat primordial?
"Like states give rise to activities"
It seems like what Aristotle is glossing over is the holistic, experiential knowledge (knowledge about how much attention to pay to someone in a social interaction, for instance) gained from doing the activity somehow gives rise to a happier psyche
Virtues are produced and developed from the same origins and by the same means as those from/by which they are corrupted
It seems like, to Aristotle, this is only metaphysical insofar as it is practical. Of course someone who experiences an event A is going to cut out the natural, reasoned apprehension of A.
"finds his enjoyment in [being temperate]" -> knows what he really wants
"Every state of the soul is naturally related to, and concerned with, the kind of things by which it is naturally made better or worse."
Temperacy is concerned with bodily pleasures, ergo, for the soul, temperacy is made better or worse by bodily pleasures
It seems like this is more of a defining than an elucidating of the soul. Are parts of us which do not follow this pattern simply not-soul?
With respect to "objects of choice" Aristotle argues
good person chooses the noble, useful, pleasant
bad person chooses shameful, harmful, painful
shameful seems a strange virtue to place here, if only because Aristotle is concerned with honour
Actions done in accordance with skills have their worth "within themselves," but actions done in accordance with virtues are done because of the manner in which they are done
i.e., there is a metaphysical difference between something with a good externality and something done for a good reason
A virtuous act to A requires
K nowledge
R ational choice of the actions for their own sake
F irm and unshakeable character
Maybe this can be rephrased as
K nowledge
F irm and unshakeable character
C hoice of the actions for their own sake
Anger and afraidness are affectations, virtues and vices are a sort of structuring of the soul in which impetuses properly flow to actions
Chapter 6 has some gems; virtue of the eye, golden mean
The golden mean is not to be attained in accordance to arithmetic progression
Each person has her own mean
Virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, in which excess and deficiency constitute misses of the mark, while the mean is praised and on target, both of which are characteristics of virtue. Virtue, then, is a kind of mean, at least in the sense that it is the sort of thing that is able to hit a mean.
greek linguistics ** what is the word for "mean" here?
"For good people are just good, while bad people are bad in all sorts of ways."
What is honour to Aristotle?
With respect to the remaining kind of pleasantness, that found in life in general, let us call the person who is pleasant in the right way friendly and the mean friendliness, while he who goes to excess will be obsequious if there is no reason for it, and a ¯atterer if he is out for his own ends; someone who falls short and is unpleasant all the time will be a quarrelsome and peevish sort of person.
For every "field" there are three dispositions ** excessive (vice), deficiency (vice), mean (virtue). It seems they are in a dialectic relationship with one another, although not a temporal-procedural one.
The mean seems adjustable
The extremes might be too far on either side of the mean
Proto-original sin right here folks? "It is the things to which we ourselves are naturally more inclined that appear more contrary to the mean; for example, we are naturally more inclined to pleasures, and are therefore more prone to intemperance than self-discipline."
Excellence in these things is noble because they are rare –** again, it seems as though he is making a comment on the human condition more than the statistical amount of virtuous people. Proto-fallenness.
Aristotle seems to think that missing pleasure is categorically good, which conflicts with his own teaching of the mean.
"But how far and to what extent someone must deviate before becoming blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reason, because nothing perceived by our senses is easily determined; such things are particulars, and judgement about them lies in perception."
Book III ** On voluntary actions, whether wickedness is voluntary, courage, temperance, and enduring pain
Voluntary vs. involuntary
An action which is done under duress can have the quality "voluntary" and "involuntary" applied to it
LNC? LNC???
Maybe there are certain aspects to which it is voluntary and to which it is involuntary.
His description of them as "mixed" would seem to suggest this
"In some cases, not praise but pardon is given"
Given the circumstances; by reason of insanity, crimes of passion, etc.
The particular action is voluntary
The general "overview" is /in/voluntary?
If someone were to claim that "sweet and noble things" are involuntary, you would end up with the view that "everyone does everything"
Since even the good itself becomes this impelling force
Forced "without qualification" is when the "agent contributes nothing"
One who does something through ignorance and feels regret is an "involuntary agent," whereas someone that feels no regret is a "non-voluntary agent"
Which is to say that voluntaricity (!?) is not even an element of the equation?
"It is probably a mistake to describe actions done through spirit or appetite as involuntary."
"What is the difference, as far as their being involuntary is concerned, between actions that miss the mark on the basis of calculation and those that miss it on the basis of spirit?"
"Appetite and spirit are shared by beings who lack reason"
A rational person acts "not from appetite"
So appetitive actions are still voluntary, they are just from a different etiology-of-the-soul
It seems like voluntary can be summarised to soul-within and soul-without
"We never believe to obtain or avoid things"
Here is maybe the root of akrasia for him
What is rational choice?
Its name implies something is "chosen before other things"
prohairesis, haireton (chosen,) pro (before)
"We deliberate about what is in our power"
There is no deliberation of "precise and self-sufficient sciences", because the consequences are clear
In finance or medicine, the consequences may be unclear
"We do not deliberate about ends" more like, We cannot deliberate about ends!!!
The person who deliberates "seems to inquire and analyse in the way described as though he were dealing with a geometrical figure"
Here he sees "not all inquiry as deliberation; all deliberation is inquiry" which seems to mean deliberation is strictly the weighing of options
"The objects of deliberation and of rational choice are the same, except that the object of rational choice has already been determined, since it is what has been decided upon as the result of deliberation"
"For each person stops inquiring how he is to act as soon has he has traced the first principle back to himself, that is, to the part of him that gives commands, because it is this that rationally chooses"
"Those who claim that the object of wish is the good are committed to the view that what a person wishes if he is choosing incorrectly is not an object of wish"
"Nothing is an object of wish by nature"
I would tend to agree with this?
Actions concerning what conduces to the end –** i.e. in concordance with good
These actions are in concordance with rational choice
And since rational choice is voluntary, these actions are voluntary
It seems like for Aristotle the good person is almost the "general person"
No one is involuntarily blessed, but wickedness is voluntary.
Human beings are "begetters" of their actions as they are of children
The ill person does not become well voluntarily, so the wicked person does not become good
I think this aligns with empirical science as well. The boundary of "knowledge" and whether it merely includes things that are semantic or whether it includes things that are habituated seems to create a muddy line between illness and moral malpractice also
It seems like A is getting at "if voluntariness is to have any meaning then it must mean…"
Actions seem to be a "mix" of voluntary and involuntary in that they are done in respect to circumstances
"Nor is he courages if he displays confidence when he is about to be flogged"
I guess he might be delusional, depending on how one defines confidence
"Fearing things not beyond his own endurance"
The golden mean for A is a pragmatic mean
Citizen courage ** it comes from a "desire for honour"
This is where my Protestantism comes out. It shouldn't be some governmental structure which endows upon you honour or shame/dishonour. It should be the good itself.
Courage was knowledge to Socrates basically because the knowledge of things allows you to withstand a situation better
Hopeful people are not "courageous," because they are only so because they have had many victories
Courage seems to be about overcoming the "appropriate" (i.e., not beyond one's limits) of pain
It is not true, then, except insofar as one achieves the end, that the exercise of every virtue is pleasant
Temperance
Intemperance is shared insofar as we are animals, not insofar as we are human
In the case of the "natural appetites," i.e. that which can be genericised, there seems to be few who miss the mark (contingent)
The temperate person does not "endure pains" but rather the intemperate feels more pain than they ought to
1119a; Even the other animals make discriminations between different kinds of food, and enjoy some but not others; and if there is anyone who finds nothing pleasant and is indifferent about everything, he must be far from being human. And because he is found so rarely, this sort of person has not been given a name.
Whether children are naturally intemperate is not discussed, but children's drives being quelled is given the same name as adult intemperance
The appetitive element in a temperate person "ought to be in harmony with reason."
Book IV ** ???
Generosity is pledged to be the pragmatic mean between stinginess and wastefulness. I think there is an interpersonal element of generosity being neglected.
Actions done in accordance with virtue are noble and done for the sake of what is noble, so the "generous person will give for the sake of what is noble and in the correct way."
Generosity is another pragmatic mean
Tyrants are not wasteful since they posess so much that their giving and spending, even if it is excessive, does not exceed what they possess
Actions done in accordance with virtue are noble and done for the
sake of what is noble.
Aristotle notices the correlation of wastefulnes and stingyness (or "obtaining money from bad sources"). Loan sharks and brothel-keepers are among those who obtain money from bad sources, "taking everything from everywhere."
Magnificent people are a subset of generous people?
"The magnificent person is like an expert, since he can see what is fitting and spend large amounts with good taste."
Greatness of soul
It seems to be about what you see yourself as worthy of.
If you are worthy of great things and see yourself as such, you are great-souled.
If you are worthy of great things but do not see yourself as such, you are small-souled.
If you are not worthy of great things and do not see yourself as such, you are still small-souled.
For Aristotle, "greatness of soul" is the "crown of the virtues"
Perhaps this is because A sees virtues as in-themselves honourable, and the striving for honour "pulls along" all the other virtues.
One can only achieve greatness of soul for A after he achieves all the other virtues.
People who have the advantages of fortune but lack virtue cannot justify the claim to be worthy of great things.
The great-souled person "does great things but is ashamed to be a beneficiary."
"Repays deeds done to him with interest so that the benefactor will become a debtor"
This is master morality
The advantages of fortune "contribute" to soul-greatness.
"Well-born are thought worthy of honour"
The great-souled person "looks down on others with justification"
This is what happens when you don't have a unitary source of the good in your theology, or an absolute focus on charity. Instead, you think that the world might just be illogical, at the hands of the gods, and some people might just be better or worse than others.
A great-souled person is "open about his likes and dislikes"
If you are not worthy of great things but see yourself as such, then you are vain.
Chapter 4
A person can be described as a "lover of such and such" in a number of senses.
We do not always apply the term 'honour-loving' to the same thing.
A discusses "loving honour more than the masses"
There is always a mean
Chapter 5
"Even temper is a mean concerned with anger"
The excess might be irrascibility
What we have just said makes clear what we said before: it is not easy
to determine how, with whom, at what, and how long one should be angry, and the limits of acting rightly and missing the mark.
Chapter 6
Another scale, obsequious vs. belligerent
The mean seems "most like friendship"
He will "associate to people in the right way" by reference to what is noble, rather than to what gets him some end or what satisfies his appetites
Chapter 7
The mean between boastfulness and self-deprecation
Achieving this mean is a corollary of striving for the truth
The truthful person: someone who is "truthful in what he says and the way he lives because that is what his state of character is like.
Someone who pretendsto greater qualities than he has does seem bad, but he is really more foolish than bad. A liar may "enjoy the lie itself," or may merely enjoy honour or gain.
Self-deprecating people
Chapter 8
Relaxation is a part of life, and one element of this is amusing diversion
Those who go too far in their humour are thought to be common buffoons who will do anything to raise a laugh, and care more about this than speaking decently and not offending those who are the butt of their jokes; while those who do not make jokes and object to other's doing so are thoguht to be boorish and austere.
There is being tastefully quick-witted, and there is being a buffoon.
There is acknowledging the awkwardness of a situation, and then there is "beef nut tomato."
"It is characteristic of a seemly person to say and listen to the sort of things that are suitable for a gentleman of good character."
Boorish — Seemly — Buffoon
Chapter 9
Shame is "more like a feeling than a state of character"
A feeling of disgrace is not characteristic of a good person, since it arises from bad actions; for these should not be done, and it makes no difference whether some actions are genuinely disgraceful, while others are only believed to be so - neither should be done, ..
I disagree
Book V
Chapter 1
What is justice?
Plato cut his teeth on this shit, man
"What is true of sciences and capacities is not true of states"
Contraries can be the concern of the same science or capacity, but not the same state
i.e. maths deals with both 1 and -1, and the same capacity allows one to add and subtract
Justice is like being - the homonymy passes unnotied
The lawless person is unjust, the lawful is just
The greedy person is unjust, the fair is just